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Abstract Recent rapid advances in Artificial Intelli-
gence (AI) and Machine Learning have raised many
questions about the regulatory and governance mech-
anisms for autonomous machines. Many commenta-
tors, scholars, and policy-makers now call for ensur-
ing that algorithms governing our lives are transpar-
ent, fair, and accountable. Here, I propose a concep-
tual framework for the regulation of AI and algorith-
mic systems. I argue that we need tools to program,
debug and maintain an algorithmic social contract, a
pact between various human stakeholders, mediated by
machines. To achieve this, we can adapt the concept
of human-in-the-loop (HITL) from the fields of mod-
eling and simulation, and interactive machine learn-
ing. In particular, I propose an agenda I call society-
in-the-loop (SITL), which combines the HITL control
paradigm with mechanisms for negotiating the values
of various stakeholders affected by AI systems, and
monitoring compliance with the agreement. In short,
‘SITL = HITL + Social Contract.’
1 Introduction
“Art goes yet further, imitating that Rationall
and most excellent worke of Nature, Man. For
by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called
a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE, (in latine
CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall Man”
Thomas Hobbes (1651). Leviathan
Despite the initial promise of Artificial Intelligence,
a long ‘AI Winter’ ensued in the 1980s and 1990s, as
problems of automated reasoning proved much harder
?An earlier version of this article was published under the
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than initially anticipated [48]. But recent years have
seen rapid theoretical and practical advances in many
areas of AI. Prominent examples include machines learn-
ing their own representations of the world via Deep
Neural Network architectures [41], Reinforcement Learn-
ing from evaluative feedback [45], and economic rea-
soning in markets and other multi-agent systems [58].
The result is an accelerating proliferation of AI tech-
nologies in everyday life [43].
These advances are yielding substantial societal ben-
efits, ranging from more efficient supply chain man-
agement, to better matchmaking in peer-to-peer mar-
kets and online dating apps, to more reliable medical
diagnosis and drug discovery [71].
But AI advances have also raised many questions
about the regulatory and governance mechanisms for
autonomous machines and complex algorithmic sys-
tems. Some commentators are concerned that algorith-
mic systems are not accountable because they are black
boxes whose inner workings are not transparent to all
stakeholders [59]. Others raised concern over people
unwittingly living in filter bubbles created by news rec-
ommendation algorithms [11, 57]. Others argue that
data-driven decision-support systems can perpetuate in-
justice, because they can also be biased either in their
design, or by picking up human biases in their training
data [13, 76]. Furthermore, algorithms can create feed-
back loops that reinforce inequality [10], for example
in the use of AI in predictive policing or creditworthi-
ness prediction, making it difficult for individuals to
escape the vicious cycle of poverty [54].
In response to these alarms, various academic and
governmental entities have started thinking seriously
about AI governance. Recently, the United States White
House National Science and Technology Council Com-
mittee on Technology released a report with recom-
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mendations ranging from eliminating bias from data,
to regulating autonomous vehicles, to introducing ethi-
cal training to computer science curricula [51]. The Eu-
ropean Union, which has enacted many personal data
privacy regulations, will soon vote on a proposal to
grant robots legal status in order to hold them account-
able, and to produce a code of ethical conduct for their
design [21]. The Institute of Electrical and Electron-
ics Engineers recently published a vision on ‘Ethically
Aligned Design’ [37]. Industry leaders have also taken
the initiative to create a ‘Partnership on AI’ to establish
best practices for AI systems and to educate the public
about AI [34].
My goal is this paper is to introduce a conceptual
framework for thinking about the regulation of AI and
data-driven systems. I argue that we need a new kind of
social contract: an algorithmic social contract, that is
a contract between various stakeholders, mediated by
machines. To achieve this, we need to adopt a society-
in-the-loop (SITL) framework in thinking about AI sys-
tems, which adapts the concept of human-in-the-loop
(HITL), from the fields of supervisory control and in-
teractive machine learning, but extends it to oversight
conducted by society as a whole.
2 Human-in-the-Loop
In a human-in-the-loop (HITL) system, a human op-
erator is a crucial component of an automated con-
trol process, handling challenging tasks of supervision,
exception control, optimization and maintenance (Fig-
ure 1). The notion has been studied for decades within
the field of supervisory control [2, 68]. Sheridan de-
fined human supervisory control as a process by which
“one or more human operators are intermittently pro-
gramming and continually receiving information from
a computer that itself closes an autonomous control
loop through artificial effectors to the controlled pro-
cess or task environment” [67].
These ideas then made their way into the field of
Human-Computer Interaction (HCI). Scientists began
working on mixed-initiative user interfaces, in which
the autonomous system can make intelligent decisions
about when and how to engage the human [36].
Recently, a number of articles have been written
about the importance of applying HITL thinking to Ar-
tificial Intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML)
systems. A simple form of HITL ML is the use of hu-
man workers to label data for training machine learning
algorithms. This has produced invaluable benchmarks
that spurred major advances in computer vision, for ex-
ample [65].
Another example of HITL ML is interactive ma-
chine learning, which can help machines learn faster or
more effectively by integrating feedback interactively
from users [3, 20]. This type of HITL ML has been
going on for a while. For example, many computer ap-
plications learn from your behavior in order to improve
their ability to serve you better (e.g. by predicting the
next word you are going to type). Similarly, when you
mark an email as ‘spam’ in an online email service,
you are one of many humans in the loop of a com-
plex machine learning algorithm (specifically an active
learning system), helping it in its continuous quest to
improve email classification as spam or non-spam.
More sophisticated examples of HITL ML are now
emerging, in which the human-in-the-loop has more
explicit knowledge of the state of the system. For in-
stance, in a crisis counseling system, a machine learn-
ing system classifies messages sent by callers, and pro-
vides visualizations to a human counselor in real-time
[23]. Thus, the human and the machine learning system
work in tandem to deliver effective counseling.
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Fig. 1: In a HITL system, a human provides monitor-
ing and supervisory functions at crucial junctions in the
system’s operation.
HITL thinking has also been applied successfully
to human-robot interaction (HRI) [12]. This includes
dynamically adapting the degree of autonomy given
to robots [19, 73], interactively teaching reinforcement
learning robots to adopt particular behaviors [74], and
designing flexible human-robot teams [38].
There is another role of the HITL paradigm, which
is closer to the problems discussed in the present arti-
cle. HITL is not only a means to improve AI systems’
accuracy in classification or to speed up the conver-
gence of a reinforcement learning robot. Rather, HITL
can also be a powerful tool for regulating the behavior
of AI systems. For instance, many scholars now advo-
cate for expert oversight, by a human operator, over the
behavior of ‘killer robots’ or credit scoring algorithms
[17].
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The presence of a human fulfills two major func-
tions in a HITL AI system:
1. The human can identify misbehavior by an other-
wise autonomous system, and take corrective ac-
tion. For instance, a credit scoring system may mis-
classify an adult as ineligible for credit, due to an
error in data entry in their age–something a human
may spot from the applicant’s photograph. Simi-
larly, a computer vision system on a weaponized
drone may mis-identify a civilian as a combatant,
and the human operator–it is hoped–would ensure
that such cases are identified, and override the sys-
tem. Some work is underway to ensure AI cannot
learn to disable their own kill-switch [56].
2. The human can be involved in order to provide an
accountable entity in case the system misbehaves.
If a fully autonomous system causes harm to hu-
man beings, having a human in the loop provides
trust that somebody would bare the consequence
of such mistakes, and thus have incentive to mini-
mize those mistakes. This person may be a human
within a tight control loop (e.g. an operator of a
drone) or a much slower loop (e.g. programmers in
a multi-year development cycle of an autonomous
vehicle). Until we find a way to punish algorithms
for harm to humans, it is hard to think of any other
alternative.
While HITL is a useful interaction paradigm for
building AI systems that are subject to oversight, I be-
lieve it does not sufficiently emphasize the role of so-
ciety as a whole in such oversight. HITL suggests that
once we put a human expert, or group of experts, within
the loop of an AI system, the problem of regulation is
solved. But as I shall discuss in the following section,
this may not always be the case.
3 Society-in-the-Loop
What happens when an AI system does not serve a nar-
row, well-defined function, but a broad function with
wide societal implications? Consider an AI algorithm
that controls millions of self-driving cars; or a set of
news filtering algorithms that influence the political be-
liefs and preferences of millions of citizens; or algo-
rithms that mediate the allocation of resources and la-
bor in an entire economy. What is the HITL equivalent
of these algorithms? This is where we make the quali-
tative shift from HITL to society in the loop (SITL).
While HITL AI is about embedding the judgment
of individual humans or groups in the optimization of
AI systems with narrow impact, SITL is about embed-
ding the values of society, as a whole, in the algorith-
mic governance of societal outcomes that have broad
implications. In other words, SITL becomes relevant
when the scope of both the input and the output of AI
systems is very broad. But one might ask, why should
this be any different?
The move from HITL to SITL raises a fundamen-
tally different problem: how to balance the competing
interests of different stakeholders, including the inter-
ests of those who govern through algorithms? This is,
traditionally, a problem of defining a social contract
[70]. To put it in the most skeletal form, we can say:
SITL = HITL + Social Contract
To elaborate on this simple equation, we need to
take a short detour into political philosophy.
4 Detour: The Social Contract
Humans are the ultimate cooperative species [53]. Cul-
tural anthropologists trace the evolution of political sys-
tems of governance from decentralized bands and tribes,
to increasingly centralized chiefdoms, sovereign states
and empires [31].
Over time, humans reached the limits of old coop-
erative institutions such as kin selection–helping oth-
ers who share their genes [30], and reciprocal altru-
ism–helping others who would later help them back
[75]. These old mechanisms cannot scale adequately
to larger groups. In the face of inter-group competi-
tion, evolutionary pressure favored the emergence, and
spread, of more complex social institutions to coordi-
nate people’s behaviors [77, 80]. For example, central-
ized sanctioning power is able to prevent higher-order
free-riding–following cooperative norms, but not con-
tributing to their enforcement–that undermine cooper-
ation in larger groups [6, 29, 69].
The founders of social contract theory, going back
to Thomas Hobbes’ landmark book, Leviathan [35],
posit that centralized government is legitimate precisely
because it enables industrious people to cooperate via
third-party enforcement of contracts among strangers
(see Figure 2). Some of these contracts are explicit,
such as marriage contracts or commercial transactions.
Other aspects of the social contract are implicit, being
embedded in social norms that govern every day life. In
both cases, the contract embodies mutual consent to the
government’s legitimate use of force–or people’s use
of social pressure– to guard people’s rights and punish
violators [8, 70].
Hobbes gave his Leviathan, the sovereign, enor-
mous power. Subsequently, the social contract under-
took many stages of evolution, thanks to enlightenment
thinkers like John Locke [47], Jean-Jacques Rousseau
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Fig. 2: The frontispiece of Thomas Hobbes’ 1651 book Leviathan by Parisian artist Abraham Bosse. The piece
is a striking depiction of how the sovereign–a giant ruling a peaceful realm through the warrior’s sword and the
monk’s crosier. The torso and arms of the figure are composed of over three hundred persons, signifying that the
Leviathan derives his power to govern, not from divine authority, but through the consent of the governed.
[64], all the way to John Rawls [62] David Gauthier
[28] and Brian Skyrms [70] in modern times. These
thinkers refined our conception of how the social con-
tract emerges in the first place, as well as the ways in
which we can keep it from collapsing.
Modern political institutions, including the mod-
ern state, are a product of these evolutionary mecha-
nisms of political development, which combine insti-
tutional innovation with learning. As Fukuyama puts
it, “[s]ocieties are not trapped by their pasts and freely
borrow ideas and institutions from each other” [26].
The result of this evolutionary process is a social
contract that can provide the efficiency and stability of
sovereign states, but which also ensures the sovereign
implements the general will [64] of the people, and is
held in some way accountable for violations of funda-
mental rights. In the same manner, “[n]ew algorithmic
decisionmakers are sovereign over important aspects of
individual lives” Thus, lack of accountability and due
process for algorithmic decisions risks “paving the way
to a new feudal order” [17].
5 The Algorithmic Social Contract
The SITL paradigm that I advocate is more akin to the
interaction between a government and a governed citi-
zenry, than the interaction between a drone and its op-
erator. Similar to the role of due process and account-
ability in the traditional social contract, SITL can be
conceived as an attempt to embed the general will into
an algorithmic social contract.
By using the social contract metaphor, the SITL
paradigm emphasizes an important distinction from the
traditional HITL paradigm (Figure 3). In a HITL sys-
tem, a human controller ensures that the AI system ful-
fills uncontested and common goals on behalf of soci-
etal stakeholders–e.g. ensuring a plane lands safely, or
improving food quality inspection. In addition, in the
SITL domain, society must agree on two aspects:
1. Society must resolve tradeoffs between the differ-
ent values that AI systems can strive towards–e.g.
tradeoffs between security and privacy, or the trade-
offs between different notions of fairness [7, 39].
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Fig. 3: Society-in-the-Loop (SITL) = Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) + Social Contract; (Top) In a HITL system, a
human controller monitors and exercises oversight over the operation of an AI system to ensure that it serves the
uncontested and common goals of its stakeholders. For example, a human pilot oversees an airplane autopilot to
increase passenger safety. (Bottom) In SITL, the AI system has broad impact, requiring various societal stake-
holders to identify the fundamental rights that the AI must respect, the ethical values that should guide the AI’s
operation, the cost and benefit tradeoffs the AI can make between various stakeholder groups, etc.
2. Society must agree on which stakeholders would
reap which benefits and pay which costs–e.g. how
improvements in safety made possible by driverless
cars are to be distributed between passengers and
pedestrians, or which degree of collateral damage,
if any, is acceptable in autonomous warfare.
In human-based government, citizens use various
channels—e.g. democratic voting, opinion polls, civil
society institutions, the media—to articulate their ex-
pectations to the government. Meanwhile, the govern-
ment, through its bureaucracy and various branches un-
dertakes the function of governing, and is ultimately
evaluated by the citizenry. And while citizens are not
involved in the details [44], they are the arbiters among
all of these institutions, and have the power to replace
their key actors.
Modern societies are (in theory) SITL human-based
governance machines. Some of those machines are bet-
ter programmed, and have better ‘user interfaces’ than
others. Similarly, as more governance functions get en-
coded into AI algorithms, we need to create channels
between human values and governance algorithms.
To implement SITL, we need to know what types
of behaviors people expect from AI, and to enable policy-
makers and the public to articulate these expectations
(goals, ethics, norms, social contract) to machines. To
close the loop, we also need new metrics and meth-
ods to evaluate AI behavior against quantifiable hu-
man values. In other words: we need to build new tools
to program, debug, and monitor the algorithmic social
contract between humans and algorithms–that is, algo-
rithms that are effective sovereigns over important as-
pects of social and economic life, whether or not they
are actually operated by governments. This requires
both government regulation and industry standards that
represent the expectations of the public, with corre-
sponding oversight.
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6 The SITL Gap
Why are we not there yet? There has been a flurry of
thoughtful treaties on the social and legal challenges
posed by the opaque algorithms that permeate and gov-
ern our lives. While these seminal writings help illumi-
nate many of the challenges, they fall short on compre-
hensive solutions.
6.1 Articulating Societal Values
One barrier to implementing SITL is the cultural di-
vide between engineering on one hand, and the human-
ities on the other (see Figure 4). Thoughtful legisla-
tors, legal scholars, media theorists, and ethicists are
very skilled at revealing moral hazards, and identify-
ing ways in which moral principles and constitutional
rights may be violated [15]. But they are not always
able to articulate those expectations in ways that engi-
neers and designers can operationalize.
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Fig. 4: In a SITL system, broad societal values (as
opposed to an individual human operator’s judgment)
must be involved in the monitoring and supervisory
function of AI systems that have wide-ranging societal
implications (as opposed to AI systems with narrow
impact).
6.2 Quantifying Externalities & Negotiating Tradeoffs
Algorithms can generate what economists refer to as
negative externalities—costs incurred by third parties
not involved in the decision [61]. For example, if au-
tonomous vehicle algorithms over-prioritize the safety
of passengers—who own them or pay to use them—
they may disproportionately increase the risk borne by
pedestrians. Quantifying these kinds of externalities is
not always straightforward, especially when they occur
as a consequence of long, indirect causal chains, or as
a result of machine code that is opaque to humans.
Once we have quantified externalities, we need to
negotiate the tradeoffs they embody. If certain ways to
increase pedestrian safety in autonomous vehicles im-
ply reduction in passenger safety, which tradeoffs are
acceptable?
Human experts already implement tradeoffs as they
design policies and products. For example, reducing
the speed limit on a road reduces the utility for drivers
who want to get home quickly, while increasing the
overall safety of drivers and pedestrians. It is possi-
ble to completely eliminate accidents—by reducing the
speed limit to zero and banning cars—but this would
also eliminate the utility of driving, and regulators at-
tempt to strike a balance that society is comfortable
with through a constant learning process.
Quantifying tradeoffs in any complex system, with
many interacting parts, is always difficult. In complex
economic systems, there are often unintended conse-
quences of design choices. As AI becomes an integral
part of such systems, the problem of quantifying those
tradeoffs becomes even harder. For example, subtle al-
gorithm design choices in autonomous vehicles may
lead to a particular tradeoff between risks to passengers
and risks to pedestrians. Identifying, let alone negoti-
ating those tradeoffs, may be much harder than setting
a speed limit–if only due to the greater degrees of free-
dom when making design choices. This may be fur-
ther complicated by the fact that algorithms learn from
their experience, which may lead to shifts in the trade-
offs being made, going beyond what the programmers
intended.
6.3 Verifying Compliance with Societal Values
Computer scientists and engineers are not always able
to quantify the behaviors of their systems such that
they can be easily understood by ethicists and legal
theorists. This makes it more difficult to scrutinize the
behavior of algorithms against set expectations. Even
simple notions such as ‘fairness’ can be formalized in
many different ways mathematically or in computer
code [7].
An important component of Figure 4 is that both
human values and AI are ongoing constant co-evolution.
Thus, the evolution of technical capability can dramat-
ically (and even irreversibly) alter what society con-
siders acceptable—think of how privacy norms have
changed because of the utility provided by smart phones
and the Internet.
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7 Bridging the Gap
There are many efforts underway to bridge the society-
in-the-loop gap. Below is an incomplete list of efforts
that I believe are relevant, and a discussion of their
merits and limitations.
7.1 Articulating Values: Design, Crowdsourcing &
Sentiment Analysis
In the broader context of technology design, various
value-sensitive design methodologies have been pro-
posed [25], which can be applied to software develop-
ment [1, 79]. These approaches may prove helpful in
the design of AI systems.
Some AI scientists propose to use of crowdsourc-
ing [18] to identify societal tradeoffs in a programmable
way. There are some efforts to collect data about peo-
ple’s preferences over values implemented in AI algo-
rithms, such as those that control driverless cars. Using
methods from the field of moral psychology, one can
identify potential moral hazards due to the incentives
of different users of the road [9]. For example, my co-
authors and I have developed a public-facing survey
tool that elicits the public’s moral expectations from
autonomous cars faced with ethical dilemmas [49]. We
have collected over 30 million decisions to date. Find-
ings from this data can help regulators and car makers
understand some of the psychological barriers to the
wide adoption of autonomous vehicles.
In many domains, it may be possible to measure so-
cietal values directly from observational data, without
having to run explicit polling campaigns or build ded-
icated crowdsourcing platforms [46]. For example, au-
tomated sentiment analysis on social media discourse
can quantify people’s reaction to different moral viola-
tions committed by AI systems. While these approaches
have their limitations, they can help gauge the evolu-
tion of public attitudes, and their readiness to accept
new social pacts through machines.
7.2 Negotiation: Social Choice & Contractarianism
The field of computational social choice [4, 50] ex-
plores the aggregation of societal preferences and fair
allocation of resources. Because these aggregation mech-
anisms can be implemented algorithmically, they pro-
vide a potential solution to the problem of negotiating
tradeoffs of different stakeholders [16, 52, 58].
An alternative approach to the negotiation of val-
ues is to use normative and meta-ethical tools from so-
cial contract theory to identify enforceable outcomes
that rational actors would be willing to opt into. For in-
stance, Leben recently proposed an algorithm that al-
lows autonomous vehicles to resolve dilemmas of un-
avoidable harm using Rawls’ Contractarianism [40]. In
particular, Leben proposes to program cars to make de-
cisions that rational actors would take if they were in a
hypothetical ‘original position’ behind a ‘veil of igno-
rance.’ This veil would, for example, conceal whether
the person is a passenger or a pedestrian in a given acci-
dent, leading them to choose the maximin solution–that
is, the decision that minimizes how bad the worse-case
outcome is.
7.3 Compliance: People Watching Algorithms
An important function for ensuring accountability is
the ability to scrutinize the behavior of those in power,
through mechanisms of trasparency. In the context of
algorithms, this does not mean having access to com-
puter source code, as intuitive as this notion might seem.
Reading the source code of a modern machine learn-
ing algorithm tells us little about its behavior, because
it is often through the interaction between algorithms
and data that things like discrimination emerge. Trans-
parency must, therefore, be about the external behavior
of algorithms. Indeed, this is how we regulate the be-
havior of humans–not by looking into their brain’s neu-
ral circuitry, but by observing their behavior and judg-
ing it against certain standards of conduct. Of course,
this observation can benefit from the ability of the algo-
rithm to give human-interpretable explanations of their
decisions [42].
The new journalistic practice of algorithmic account-
ability reporting provides a framework for scrutiny of
algorithmic decisions that is purely behavioral [22].
As an example, Sweeney has demonstrated that Web
searches for names common among African Ameri-
cans cause online advertising algorithms to serve ads
suggestive of an arrest record, which can harm the in-
dividual being searched [72]. Investigative journalism
has also revealed evidence of price discrimination based
on users’ information, sparking a debate about the ap-
propriateness of this practice [78].
We might also envision a role for professional al-
gorithm auditors, people who interrogate algorithms to
ensure compliance with pre-set standards. This interro-
gation may utilize real or synthetic datasets designed to
identify whether an algorithm violates certain require-
ments. For instance, an algorithm auditor may provide
sample job applications to identify if a job matching al-
gorithm is discriminating between candidates based on
irrelevant factors. Or an autonomous vehicle algorithm
auditor may provide simulated traffic scenarios to en-
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sure the vehicle is not disproportionately increasing the
risk to pedestrians or cyclists in favor of passengers.
One weakness of auditing in a simulated environment–
using computer simulation or fake data–is the poten-
tial for adversarial behavior: the algorithm being au-
dited may attempt to trick the algorithm doing the au-
diting. This is similar to ‘defeat devices,’ a term used
to describe software or hardware features that inter-
fere with or disables car emissions controls under real
world driving conditions, even if the vehicle passes for-
mal emissions testing [27]. In a similar fashion, an au-
tonomous vehicle control algorithm may detect that it
is being tested in a virtual environment–e.g. by notic-
ing that the distribution of scenarios is skewed towards
ethical dilemmas–and behave differently under such
testing conditions.
The possibility of this generalized ‘defeat device’
subversion necessitates continuous monitoring and au-
diting in real-world conditions, not just simulated con-
ditions at certification time. Such continuous monitor-
ing may benefit from automation, as I discuss in the
next section.
7.4 Compliance: Algorithms Watching Algorithms
Recently, Amitai and Oren Etzioni proposed a new class
of algorithms, called oversight programs, whose func-
tion is to “monitor, audit, and hold operational AI pro-
grams accountable” [24]. Note the emphasis on ‘oper-
ational,’ suggesting that these oversight programs are
aligned with the point I made earlier about the futility
of source code inspection as the only means for regu-
lation.
Oversight algorithms, thus, perform a similar func-
tion to today’s spam filtering algorithms. But their scope
is much wider, as they investigate suspicious behavior
by rogue AI algorithms maliciously violating human
values. For example, a new class of browser plug-ins
is allowing independent, data-driven auditing of the in-
formation provided by online advertising platforms to
advertisers [14]. This has revealed issues in the trans-
parency and accuracy of the current algorithmically-
mediated online advertising ecosystem.
One can imagine an algorithm that conducts real-
time quantification of the amount of bias caused by
a news filtering algorithm–akin to Facebook’s recent
study [5]–and raising an alarm if bias increases beyond
a certain threshold.
7.5 The Limits of Public Engagement
It is worth highlighting the limits of crowdsourcing
of societal values in general, and when it comes to
AI in particular. One of the most influential figures in
20th century journalism, Walter Lippman, warned of
over-reliance on public opinion when it comes to pol-
icy matters that require significant expertise. In Lipp-
man’s words, “Public opinion is not a rational force....
It does not reason, investigate, invent, persuade, bar-
gain or settle” [44]. This is because it is impossible
for a lay person to be fully informed about all facets
of every policy question: even an expert practitioner
or regulator in one field–say medicine–cannot be suf-
ficiently informed to weigh in on policy matters in an-
other field–say monetary policy. The role of public opin-
ion, Lippman contends, is to check the use of sovereign
force, based on assessments made digestible to them by
disagreeing experts, pundits and journalists.
There is a lot of merit in Lippman’s argument. But
he misses a second important role that the public plays:
that of shaping moral values and norms. Experts alone
cannot dictate what societal values should be. They can
influence those values by providing relevant facts, such
as the importance of physical exercise in promoting
health, or the importance of recycling in the preser-
vation of the environment. But ultimately, norms are
shaped through the interaction of various social and
evolutionary forces [33, 63]. And these values must in-
fluence the metrics against which the performance of
experts–or AI algorithms–is measured.
8 Discussion
The ideas outlined in this article are not entirely new,
and many have been discussed in the context of digital
democracy [32] and the data-driven society [60]. Tim
O’Reilly recently coined the term algorithmic regula-
tion to describe data-driven governance [55]. To O’Reilly,
successful algorithmic regulation must satisfy the fol-
lowing properties (quoted verbatim):
1. A deep understanding of the desired outcome
2. Real-time measurement to determine if that out-
come is being achieved
3. Algorithms (i.e. a set of rules) that make adjust-
ments based on new data
4. Periodic, deeper analysis of whether the algorithms
themselves are correct and performing as expected.
I agree with O’Reilly’s characterization. From my per-
spective, the identification and negotiation of desired
outcomes are non-trivial problems. And ensuring that
algorithms are performing as expected is not just a tech-
nical challenge, but also a social one. This is what makes
the social contract framework helpful.
Note that SITL operates at different time-scales than
HITL. It looks more like public feedback on regula-
8
tions and legislations, than feedback on frequent micro-
level decisions. Nevertheless, I believe there is value
in ensuring we pay attention to all component of ‘the
loop’ using an explicit framework. This will be increas-
ingly important as the time between diagnosis and pol-
icy adjustment becomes shorter, thanks to progress in
data science and machine learning.
I attempted to synthesize various concerns and so-
lutions put forward by many scholars who are think-
ing about the regulation of algorithmic systems that
govern social and economic life. I organized these dis-
cussions within two paradigms that have a long his-
tory: the human-in-the-loop paradigm from the fields
of computer science and supervisory control, and the
‘social contract’ paradigm from political philosophy.
The result can be summarized by a call-to-arms that
defines the challenge ahead:
to build institutions and tools that put the society-
in-the-loop of algorithmic systems, and allows
us to program, debug, and monitor the algorith-
mic social contract between humans and gover-
nance algorithms.
The Age of Enlightenment marked humanity’s tran-
sition towards the modern social contract, in which po-
litical legitimacy no longer emanates from the divine
authority of kings, but from the mutual agreement among
free citizens to appoint a sovereign. We spent centuries
taming Hobbes’s Leviathan, the all-powerful sovereign
[35]. We must now create and tame the new Techno-
Leviathan.
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